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ABSTRACT
Our purpose in this paper is to develop and estimate a model of the US
automobile industry that can be used to analyze the secular and cyclical
strategic markup behavior and market structure of its three major domestic
producers -- GM, Ford and Chrysler. The principal novelty in this paper is
not such much in the underlying theory (we build on what Timothy Bresnahan has
called the "new empirical industrial organization" literature), but rather in
the actual empirical implementation of a multi-equation model sufficiently
general to permit the testing of a variety of specific behavioral postulates
associated with the interdependent strategic profit-maximizing behavior of GM,
Ford and Chrysler.
Using firm-specific annual data from 1959-83, we find that at usual
levels of statistical significance, we cannot reject Cournot quantity-setting
behavior, nor can we reject leader/follower quantity-setting behavior with GM
as leader and Ford and Chrysler as followers; the parameter restrictions
associated with leader/follower behavior are slightly more binding than those
with Cournot, although the difference is not decisive. In terms of the
cyclical analysis of market behavior, our most striking result is the great
diversity of behavior we find among GM, Ford and Chrysler. Depending on which
firm is being analyzed, there is support for the pro-cyclical "conventional
wisdom" of markups (GM and Ford), as well as for the counter-cyclical
"revisionist" literature (Chrysler). Diversity, rather than constancy and
homogeneity, best characterizes firms in this industry.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years a considerable literature has emerged reporting results
from estimating the market structure of a number of industries, and the
behavioral relations among firms within these industries. Much of this
literature is based on a theoretical framework recently surveyed by Timothy
Bresnahan [1989]. Bresnahan outlines an econometric approach to measuring
market power, in which parametric representations rather than accounting data
are employed to measure unobservable marginal cost and markups; he calls this
the "new empirical industrial organization" (NEIO). Data limitations,
however, have made it difficult to develop models that can be used to test
explicit behavioral hypotheses concering firms' interdependent pricing and
markup behavior.1 Thus most of the analyses to date have tended to focus on
the exercise of market power by broad industry aggregates (e.g., Gollop and
Roberts [1979], Appelbaum [1982], Hall [1986,1988], Domowitz, Hubbard and
Peterson [1988], Morrison [1988,1990]), or by product type (Bresnahan [1981]).
This suggests that it would be fruitful to employ the basic theoretical
framework of the NEIO, but to implement it empirically on several individual
firms in one industry for which firm-specific micro-economic data can be
constructed. In this connection the auto industry appears to be particularly
promising for a number of reasons. 2
First, during the past two decades, this industry has been subject to
significant exogenous shocks (e.g., the dramatic oil price changes and the
apparent shift in consumer tastes toward Japanese cars), and thus it is of
interest to analyze changes in firm and industry behavior in response to such
shocks. Second, since the automobile industry has often been characterized as
a "classic oligopoly", it is particularly attractive for assessing the
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relevance of models of oligopolistic behavior, such as Courtnot quantity-
setting and leader/follower models. Third, Friedlaender, Winston and Wang
[1983] and Aizcorbe, Winston and Friedlaender [1987] have constructed a data
set on the auto industry, thereby permitting a much richer characterization of
firm and industry costs and market behavior than has generally been available
in empirical models of this nature.
Our purpose in this paper, therefore, is to develop and estimate a model
of the US automobile industry that can be used to analyze the secular and
cyclical strategic behavior and market structure of its major domestic
producers -- GM, Ford and Chrysler. The principal novelty in this paper is
not so much in the basic methodology (we build on the NEIO), but rather in the
empirical implementation of a multi-equation model sufficiently general to
permit the testing of a variety of specific behavioral postulates associated
with the strategic profit maximizing behavior of firms in the US auto
industry. We also analyze the nature and cylicality of the firm-specific
exercise of market power.
Our paper takes the following form. In Section II we outline a
theoretical framework that can be used to test various behavioral hypotheses
(unconstrained profit maximization, Cournot quantity-setting behavior, and
leader/follower conduct). In Section III we discuss issues involved in
empirical implementation, overview the data and detail the stochastic
specification, and then in Section IV we present and interpret a host of
empirirical results. Finally, in Section VI we summarize and suggest issues
for future research. Three appendices accompany this paper, the first
concerning data construction and sources, the second presenting a stylized
framework for understanding cyclical variations in markups, and the third
consisting of tables with additional econometric results.
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section we first describe a simple Cournot model of myopic
behavior in which each firm assumes others will not respond to its profit-
maximizing quantity-setting behavior. We develop specific hypothesis tests to
assess whether this strategic behavioral assumption can be accepted or
rejected. We then develop a leader/follower model that also involves testable
cross-equation parameter restrictions. A priori, we do not expect that either
of these extreme cases adequately describe the complexities of oligopolistic
markets, and therefore we indicate how our framework can be generalized to
analyze the exercise of market power among firms and over time, without
relying on such restrictive and specific behavioral hypotheses concerning firm
interactions. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the constraints imposed
by empirical implementability compel us to work within an essentially static
optimization context. Since in fact the process of strategic interaction
among firms is inherently dynamic, at best our static models should be viewed
as reduced form solutions to these dynamic games or interactions.3
We begin by assuming there are three firms whose products are close
substitutes, and that each firm sets quantities so as to maximize expected
profits.4 For simplicity, we assume each firm produces a single product,
although this is not essential to the argument. Let yi be the production
level of each firm, whose costs depend on its output level alone (for
notational simplicity we suppress the other arguments of the cost function),
C i - Ci(Yi). (1)
However, the demand and therefore the revenue functions of each firm depend
not only upon its own output, but also on the output of the other firms. We
can thus characterize the revenue function of each firm as
R i - Ri(Yl,Y 2 ,Y 3 ), i - 1,2,3 (2)
and each firm's profit function as
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wi(Yl,Y2,Y3 ) - Ri(yl,Y 2 ,y3) - Ci(Yi), i - 1,2,3. (3)
Thus far, our analysis is entirely general and incorporates no specific
behavioral assumptions. It should be clear, however, that the key elements
are the revenue functions and the extent to which each firm recognizes demand
interdependencies embodied in (2) and exploits them in maximizing profits in
(3). We begin by analyzing the simplest case of myopic firm behavior, in
which each firm follows the Cournot assumption that its quantity-setting
behavior will not lead to quantity responses on the part of its competitors,
resulting in the familiar Nash equilibrium. In this case, each firm maximizes
its profits using the usual marginal revenue/marginal cost (MR/MC) conditions
R1 1(yi ,y k )  aCi (Yi)S- i - 1,2,3 and i ' j,k , (4)8 y i  ayi
where the superscript bars indicate that the firm views the output of its
competitors as being exogenous and thus not influenced by its behavior. As
Bresnahan [1989] has shown, if one specifies revenue as the product of the
inverse demand function and output quantity, equation (4) can be re-written as
the following profit-maximizing behavioral expression for each firm:
P. (yi ,yyk
P. - MC. - y Y (5)
1 1 y i
As another extreme example, consider a leader/follower model in which
firm 1 acts as a leader and the other two firms act as followers. Assume that
firm 1 recognizes the interdependency of demand and therefore determines its
profit maximizing quantity level taking this interdependence into account.
Firms 2 and 3 then observe this output and determine their profit maximizing
output simultaneously, ignoring any interdependency between their own demand
and that of their competitors. It is worth noting that although this process
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is inherently dynamic and sequential, for empirical purposes we model it as
being simultaneous and static. Since the period of observation is typically a
year, this appears to be a plausible assumption, for the automobile product or
reaction cycle is generally less than a year.5
If firms 2 and 3 act as Cournot followers, their revenue function is
given by
Ri - R (Y'Yi'Yj) i - 2,3 and i ' l,j (6)
where the superscript bars indicate that other firms' outputs are viewed as
being exogenous from the perspective of firm i. Thus each follower will
maximize its profits using the traditional MR/MC condition
R.i(yl,Yi,Y.) 8Ci(Y i )
ayi  ayi
which yields a reaction function for each follower as
Yi i(Y 1 'Yjj) , i - 2,3 and ifj. (8)
However, since yj is also a function of yl and yi, (8) can also be written as
Yi " Oi(Yl , j(YlYi)) (9)
which can be solved for yi as a function of yl alone:
yi " Yi(Y 1), i - 2,3. (10)
Now if firm 1 correctly perceives the behavioral response of firms 2 and
3, it can utilize this information in its revenue function, now written as
R1 - R1(Y1, Y2(Y1), Y3(Y1)). (11)
Using the chain rule, we derive the MR/MC condition for firm 1 as
aR1 aR1 aR1 Y2  aR1 aY3  a1
- + + (12)
Y 1 Y1 aY2 ay1 aY3 aY1 ay
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Alternatively, since R1 - yl1 Pl[Y 1,Y2(Y1 ),y3(Yl)], the MR/MC condition can
also be written as
P8P1[Y1Y 2(Y1), Y3(Y1)]PI - MC - Y (13)1 1 l1 ayl
where aPl/ayl is the derivative of firm l's inverse demand function with
respect to its own output, taking a form analogous to the derivative of
revenue with respect to yl in equation (12).
It is of course the case that the behavior of firms in oligopolistic
markets is extremely complex, and thus it would not be surprising if firms
behaved in ways more complicated than that implied by the relatively simple
Cournot or leader/follower models.6 It is useful, therefore, that we
recognize this complexity explicitly and rewrite the MR/MC condition, more
generally than in (5) or (13), as
aPi(')
P. - MC - Yi (14)
where the expression aPi(.)/8y i is an unspecified relationship among
interdependent firms' prices and outputs.
It should be noted that the general form of the MR/MC conditions in the
case of competitive (Cournot) oligopolistic behavior, the leader/follower
behavior, and the generalized maximizing behavior is identical, with the
difference being in the nature of the term reflecting the response of the own
price of a given firm to changes in its own output, aPi/ay i . Hence, in terms
of econometric implementation, while the general specification of each of
these cases is identical, the precise interpretation of the coefficients
embedded in aPil/ay i will differ under alternative behavioral assumptions.
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III. TOWARDS AN EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
To implement this rather general theoretical framework empirically,
functional forms must be specified for the cost and output demand functions,
and stochastic assumptions must be detailed. We assume the cost function for
the ith firm can be approximated using the normalized quadratic form7
. n-i . n-I n-I . . n-1 n-I -
C.i - a0i + a iswis + .5 1 a iskWisWik + a w.sy y  + ai istWisi
s-1 s-1 k-1 s-1 s-i
2 2
+ aiy i + .5.*ayyy. + aitti + aitytiYi + .5-a itt (15)
where win is the unnormalized price of the nth input for firm i, wis " wis/win
is the normalized input price, unnormalized costs are Ci , normalized costs are
Ci W Ci/win, and ti is a product mix variable (defined as the proportion of
large vehicles -- greater than 3,000 lbs. -- in total vehicle production).
Denoting input quantities for the ith firm as xis, s - 1,...,n, it follows that
n . n-1 .
C. - w. x. and C. - 1 w.xi + x. (16)i I isis and C i =IWisxis + Xin (16)
s-I s-i
Using Shephard's Lemma, we obtain the cost-minimizing demand functions for n-I
inputs as
ac. n-1
Sis -- - a.is + aiskik + a i s  + istti s-,...,n-l, (17)
8w. k- w
and derive the cost-minimizing demand for the normalized input xin by solving
the second equation in (16) for xin and then substituting (15) for Ci and
(17) for xis. We further specify that each firm's inverse demand function can
be written as a linear approximation, with each firm's output being
- PAGE 7 -
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imperfectly substitutable. We write this inverse demand function facing each
of the three automakers as
- 3
P. - 6..iY. + 6zz (18)
where Pi = Pi/win is the normalized output price and z is a vector of
exogenous variables common to all three firms. This normalization is needed
to ensure consistency between the cost and demand functions, and the MR/MC
conditions. Firm-specific revenue functions are therefore given by
- - 3
R - Yi Pi(yl'Y2'Y 3 ' z) - yi* [ 6ijyj + 6iz]. (19)
j-1
Solving for the MR/MC equilibrium condition within this framework yields the
following general expression, analogous to (5):
Pi - MCi + AiYi
n-l
aiy + .iyvi +  . w. + a. t. + X y. (20)
sy 1y1 1 sy is ity 1 1 1(s-1
where Ai takes on different specific values depending on the behavioral model
being postulated. We now consider several special cases of Ai .
Consider first the case of Cournot behavior, where each firm treats the
other's output as constant.8 This yields an expression for Ai in (20) as
Ai - - 6ii, i - 1,2,3. (21)
Thus, to test the Cournot model as a special case of the more general
framework in (20), we impose the three coefficient restrictions in (21), in
addition to the cross-equation coefficient restrictions required to ensure
consistency among the parameters estimated in the input demand functions, the
output demand functions, and the MR/MC condition.9
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An alternative behavioral assumption is that the auto market is
characterized by leader-follower relationships. Let firm 1 be the leader, and
firms 2 and 3 be Cournot followers. For firms 2 and 3, the MR/MC conditions
take the form of equations (20) and (21). For the leader firm, however, the
MR/MC condition is more complex, for it must incorporate the reaction
functions of firms 2 and 3. These reaction functions are obtained by
substituting the right-hand side of the follower's inverse demand function
(18) for the left-hand price term in the followers' MR/MC condition (20) and
(21), and then solving for each follower's output as a function of the other
firms' outputs and the exogenous variables. This yields
M. - 6.z - 6 ily - 6 ikYk
y -Mi(Yl'Yk) - 26..- a. - 2,3 and ifk (22)
11 iyy
where Mi, part of the marginal cost term for the follower firms, is defined as
n-1
M. - a. + a. w. + a ity i - 2,3. (23)i ly s-1 isy is ity i
The above expression yields a system of two equations (one for each
follower firm) that can be solved in terms of yl, the exogenous elements in
the demand function z, and the elements of the partial marginal cost function
Mi, which then generate the leader's revenue function as
RI - 1'P 1 [Y1l , Y2(Y1 ,M2 ,6ýz), y3(Y1 ,M3 ,6Wz)] (24)
where yi(Y 1 ,Mi,6jz), i - 2,3, can be expressed as
Y2 - [(2633 - a3yy)'(M 2 - 62 1Y 1 - 62 z) - 62 3 (M3 - 63 1Y 1 - 63 z)]/A (25)
Y3 - [(2622 - a2yy)'(M 3 - 631Yl - 63 z) - 63 2 (M2 - 621Y1 - 62 z)]/A (26)
and where
A = (2622 - a2yy)'(26 3 3 - a3 yy) - 632623. (27)
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Finally, substituting (25) and (26) into the leader's inverse demand function
(18), differentiating it with respect to yl, and then substituting these
derivatives into the leader's MR/MC condition (13) yields a value for A1 in
(20) that can be written as
A1 - { -611 + 6121621(2633 - a3yy) - 623631]/A
+ 613[631(2622 - a2yy) - 621632 ]/A) . (28)
This completes the specification of our leader-follower model. Note that
although the leader-follower model has restrictions on the Ai parameters for
firms 2 and 3 that are identical to the Cournot model, the restriction on A1
in (28) implied by the leader-follower model is quite different from that for
A1 in the Cournot model (21). Hence, the Cournot and leader-follower models
each involve three independent restrictions on the Ai parameters, and the
models are non-nested.
Furthermore, by estimating equation (20) directly without constraint,
the above framework can be used to analyze the degree of market power and how
it may have changed over time. Specifically, since Pi - MCi -" i'Yi,
where Ai is a parameter estimated from the MR/MC condition (20), one can
assess the extent to which firms have exercised their market power, without
imposing specific strategic behavioral assumptions. By allowing the markup to
change over time in response to various supply and demand shocks, one can also
determine how the exercise of market power changes with respect to different
market conditions, stages of the business cycle, and so forth.1 0
Before proceeding with a discussion of data and stochastic specifica-
tion, we now briefly consider several other issues in empirical implementa-
tion. For each of the three automakers, we specify three inputs whose prices
enter the firm-specific cost function: materials (xM), capital (xK) and labor
(xL). Since problems in constructing reliable micro-data on capital input are
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particularly troublesome and well-known, we employ a long-run cost function
and treat capital as a variable input, thereby implicitly assuming that the
measurement error problems associated with having xK as a regressor are
potentially more significant than the possible mis-specification resulting
from treating that input as variable rather than fixed in the short-run.
To ensure that the cost function is homogeneous in factor prices, we
normalize costs and input prices by the price of labor, wL. We jointly
estimate the materials, capital and labor input demand equations, where the
normalized cost function (15) is substituted into the labor demand equation
implicit in (16). Thus our system of cost-input demand equations takes the
following form:
xMi - Dil + aillwil + 0il2wi2 + ailyYi + ailtti (29)
XKi - ai2 + ail2Wil + ai22wi2 + ai2yYi + ai2tti (30)
xLi 0 aOi + ciyYi + aitti + .itytiYi + .5-aittt? + .5aiyyY
.5*aillwil - ail2wilwi2 - .5*ci22wi2 (31)
The output demand relationships for each firm are estimated by using a
linear approximation to a normalized inverse demand function
- 3
P. 60i + 6 ijYj + 6 GNP + 6 5iNR + 6 6iUN
j-1
+ 6 7iGAS + 6 8CPI + 6 9EXR , i - 1,2,3, (32)7i 8i 9i
where GNP is real gross national product, INR is the interest rate, UN the
unemployment rate, GAS the real gas price, CPI the consumer price index, and
EXR the dollar/yen exchange rate, all defined at the bottom of Table 1.
To estimate marginal costs and markups, we specify and then estimate
parameters in a system of equations consisting of demand equations for three
inputs (capital, labor and materials), an inverse output demand equation, and
an equation based on the profit maximization assumption of marginal revenue
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equals marginal cost, where the marginal revenue equation includes the
conjectured strategic response of other firms. This five equation system is
specified for each of the three firms, GM, Ford and Chrysler, and the
resulting 15-equation system is estimated using the method of nonlinear three-
stage least squares (3SLS), with appropriate cross-equation constraints
imposed (both within and between firms) to ensure consistency among the
equations.
A distinguishing feature of this research effort is that we employ firm-
specific data. Although there are numerous well-known problems in
constructing reliable micro data, we view our modelling effort with firm-
specific data as somewhat exploratory, helping us to assess whether employing
data with admitted deficiencies generates plausible findings. In our context,
the data requirements for the markup and interdependent pricing model include
prices and quantities of output and the three inputs for each firm, a product
mix variable for each firm (the proportion of large vehicles in total vehicle
production), as well as a set of exogenous demand-shifting variables common
among the three firms.
The data set for this study consists of annual data from 1959-83, based
on that originally constructed and employed by Ana Aizcorbe, Clifford Winston
and Ann F. Friedlaender [1987]. We describe this data set in greater detail
(particularly our extensions) in Appendix I to this paper. These data are
summarized, however, in Table 1 below, where we present variable definitions
as well as sample means, minimum and maximum values, and standard deviations
for all the variables used in our empirical analysis.
In terms of endogenous and exogenous variables, we assume that the
macro-economic inverse demand equation variables in (32) are exogenous, as are
the input price variables; however, output quantity, output price (and
implicitly, marginal cost and markup) are endogenous, as are input quantities
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR 1959-1983 AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURING DATA SET
COMPANY VARIABLE
Materials Innut
Labor Input
Capital Input
Materials Price
Labor Price
Capital Price
Output Quantity
Output Price
Product Mix
FORD Materials Input
Labor Input
Capital Input
Materials Price
Labor Price
Capital Price
Output Quantity
Output Price
Product Mix
CHRYSLER Materials Input
Labor Input
Capital Input
Materials Price
Labor Price
Capital Price
Output Quantity
Output Price
Product Mix
COMMON DEMAND VARIABLES:
MEAN
21496.23
521.18
163.62
0.76
25.71
54.08
4.94
5951.35
0.72
12525.96
208.24
122.12
0.84
23.67
52.30
2.55
5968.43
0.57
5206.45
113.85
48.46
0.96
21.16
50.55
1.17
5986.05
0.62
MIN VALUE
12994.46
421.26
61.88
0.34
13.15
14.29
2.97
4779.30
0.35
8359.32
148.36
37.55
0.42
11.49
9.80
1.52
5141.47
0.14
2116.06
45.96
13.97
0.59
8.67
9.33
0.54
5427.33
0.03
MAX VALUE
30716.98
618.36
277.73
1.08
33.95
98.70
6.72
6589.17
0.85
20136.33
256.61
223.45
1.24
33.73
113.01
3.77
6625.85
0.85
8064.78
178.09
147.83
1.21
28.44
107.53
1.69
6937.95
0.89
GNP
Interest Rate
Unemployment Rate
Gasoline Price
CPI
Exchange Rate
Definitions and Units of Measurement:
Material Input
Labor Input
Capital Input
Material Price
Materials Cost/Materials Price Index, $ Millions
Labor Cost/Labor Price Index, $ Millions
Capital Costs/Capital Price Index, $ Millions
1975 $ per pound of material
STD. DEV.
5388.78
57.41
59.15
0.26
7.35
30.48
1.12
495.00
0.14
3369.09
34.96
67.77
0.28
7.40
35.55
0.61
363.72
0.21
1818.51
31.16
34.40
0.23
6.80
33.75
0.34
387.52
0.23
1411.60
1.38
5.98
221.22
1.05
4.19
868.93
-3.50
3.50
117.95
1.00
2.36
1805.46
4.61
9.70
309.59
1.15
5.13
308.41
2.26
1.70
68.11
0.05
9.45
- PAGE 13 -
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Labor Price Thousand $ per worker per year
Capital Price Rental price, percentage points
Output Quantity Millions of autos produced
Output Price Average Revenue ($ per auto)
Product Mix Share of Intermediate Size Autos Produced
GNP Gross National Product in $1982 Billions
Interest Rate U.S. Treasury bond yield minus percent change in GNP
deflator
Unemployment Unemployment Rate, Percentage Points
Gasoline Price Gasoline Price Index/CPI, 1967 - 100
CPI Consumer Price Index, 1975 - 1.00
Exchange Rate US Dollars/1,000 Japanese Yen
Note: In estimation, all prices and dollar-denominated exogenous demand
variables are deflated by the GNP deflator; all are in $1975.
demanded. Although we do not explicitly model determinants of the product mix
variable, in estimation we treat it as jointly determined and account for
possible simultaneity by employing an instrumental variable estimator. Each
of our equations is over-identified. We append an additive disturbance term
to each of the fifteen equations in our system, and assume that the resulting
disturbance vector is identically and independently multivariate normally
distributed, with mean vector zero and nonsingular disturbance covariance
matrix 0. Estimation was undertaken using the three-stage least squares
commands in the TSP computer software program on a MicroVAX 3200 computer.1 1
As discussed in the previous section, our framework enables us to test
the Cournot and leader/follower models as special cases of the most general
model in which no constraints are placed on the Ai parameters. For testing
such hypotheses, we employ the Wald (quasi-likelihood ratio) test statistic
procedure, as adapted to the nonlinear three-stage least squares context by
Gallant and Jorgenson [1979].
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We now move on to a discussion of empirical findings, first focusing on
the type of interdependent pricing behavior we find among GM, Ford and
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Chrysler, and then examining more closely the factors affecting the changing
markup behavior of these automakers.
In Table 2 we present 3SLS parameter estimates assuming that the three
automakers maximize profits, but without specifying the precise nature of
their strategic interdependence; as was noted in Section III, under this
profit maximization with unconstrained strategic behavior specification, no
constraints are placed on the Ai parameters. In this model, estimates of the
cost function parameters all are negative for all three firms, for a2 2 they
are negative for GM and Ford, and for all firms aly and a2y are positive, as
is required by the underlying economic theory of cost and production; the
positive estimate of a2 2 for Chrysler is statistically insignificant.
Further, as expected, estimates of A are positive for all three firms; the
estimate for GM (4.429) is smallest, while that for Chrysler (92.675) is
largest; since from (14) and (20) it is clear that the Ai are simply
interpreted as estimates of -aPi/aYi, the relative values of the Ai estimates
merely suggest that this derivative is smallest for GM and largest for
Chrysler. On the output demand side, estimates of the 6ii parameters in the
inverse demand equations are all negative, consistent with the theory; while
Ford and GM are "substitutes" (estimates of 6GF and 6FG are positive),
Chrysler and Ford, and Chrysler and GM are "complements" (estimates of 6CF,
6FC, 6CG and 6GC are negative). Note that in interpreting these parameter
estimates, one must recognize their very partial nature; for example, the
negative estimate of 6GG implies that if GM increases sales while the quantity
of autos sold by Ford and Chrylser is unchanged, then the price of GM cars
will fall, ceteris paribus. Estimates of demand elasticities allowing for
strategic interactions (both quantity and price) require a different and more
INTERDEPENDENT MARKUP BEHAVIOR
Table 2
3SLS PARAMETER ESTIMATES -- PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
WITH UNCONSTRAINED STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
(Asymptotic t-statistics in Parentheses)
Parameter Ford
-797.063
(-9.710)
5220.880
(3.223)
-137283.000
(-3.974)
-709.159
(-3.946)
3842.160
(17.120)
Variable
Constant
Chrysler
-307.679
(-11.099)
241.192
(0.658)
GM
-972.801
(-5.173)
-6523.165
(-2.101)
-80466.560
(-1.814)
248.978
(0.476)
3864.986
(10.092)
14919.090
(4.470)
74.572
(1.539)
-9.046
(-1.009)
21.957
(4.028)
-11.860
(-0.203)
372.419
(7.642)
789.641
(1.706)
-402.352
(-7.931)
-1.842
(-0.215)
6530.890
(8.187)
213.177
(7.449)
-16.046
(-4.323)
9.942
(1.562)
-105.268
(-3.044)
388.735
(8.938)
1399.696
(6.488)
-330.842
(-9.093)
-49.287
(-2.756)
-12309.290
(-3.185)
-358.791
(-7.133)
3824.265
(25.630)
2986.129
(9.213)
121.788
(7.482)
1.034
(0.560)
-32.052
(-6.073)
-34.725
(-1.497)
342.829
(13.444)
429.587
(6.364)
-162.938
(-6.068)
-121.366
(-4.913)
all
a1 2
aly
alt
w1Y
wit
w2w2
w2Y
a2t
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a y
w2t
toy
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t
2
Constant
YFord
YChrysler
GNP
Interest Rate
Unemployment
Gas Price
CPI
Exchange Rate
MARKUP BEHAVIOR
1825.000 -1763.041
(2.137)
4.429
(1.148)
624.744
(6.998)
-4.359
(-0.913)
7.677
(0.863)
-34.903
(-1.790)
-0.289
(-7.653)
9.633
(5.779)
-19.986
(-8.781)
-0.298
(-1.990)
389.428
(4.114)
-0.004
(-5.946)
(-4.929)
20.044
(2.312)
1045.436
(9.660)
12.422
(2.273)
-48.297
(-4.265)
-54.059
(-2.218)
-0.136
(-2.918)
4.409
(2.209)
-16.543
(-5.665)
-0.932
(-5.140)
40.060
(0.340)
-0.004
(-5.816)
att
OTHER STATISTICS
R2
System E'HH'E - 32(
Materials 0.777
Capital 0.693
Labor 0.325
Inverse Demand 0.949
MR-MC 0.670
0.719
0.729
0.315
0.990
0.733
Number of Observations Per
0.968
0.022
0.647
0.975
0.896
Equation - 25
complex computation than simply examining magnitudes of the 6ij parameters; we
discuss such "general equilibrium" demand elasticities later in this section.
For the moment, however, note also that signs of the other estimated 6
parameters are the same across firms, although the variation in magnitudes is
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-382.194
(-3.097)
92.675
(6.114)
1550.709
(8.781)
-27.646
(-3.068)
-19.863
(-1.082)
-114.771
(-2.859)
-0.148
(-1.942)
11.406
(3.450)
-27.673
(-5.852)
-2.020
(-6.764)
75.229
(0.392)
-0.004
(-3.346)
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substantial.
At the bottom of Table 2, equation-specific R2 values are reported;
these values appear reasonable (those for the inverse demand equation are
particularly gratifying), although the R2 value for the capital demand
equation for Chrysler (.022) is very low.
As we noted in Section III, the Cournot model of strategic interactions
is a special case of our most general model, and involves placing three
restrictions on the Ai parameters (Ai - - 6ii, i - GM, Ford and Chrysler).
From Table 2 it is clear that the unconstrained estimates of Ai, particularly
for GM and Chrysler, are very close to estimates of -6ii, and thus it would
not be surprising if these restrictions were consistent with our data. In
Table 3 we report results from testing Cournot as a special case of the
unconstrained profit maximization model; the Wald (quasi-likelihood ratio)
test statistic is 3.975, while the chi-square critical values with three
degrees of freedom are 4.108 (75% confidence level), 6.251 (90%), and 7.815
(95%). We conclude that the constraints implied by the Cournot model are
consistent with our data, given usual confidence levels.
Table 3
RESULTS OF TESTING FOR STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
USING QUASI-LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST
HO: Unconstrained Strategic Behavior
H1 : Cournot Behavior X2(3 d.f.) Test Statistic: 3.975
HO: Unconstrained Strategic Behavior
H1 : GM Leader-Follower Behavior X2(3 d.f.) Test Statistic: 4.614
X2(3 d.f.) Critical Values: 2.366 (50%), 4.108 (75%), 6.251 (90%), 7.815 (95%)
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3SLS parameter estimates with the Cournot strategic behavior
restrictions imposed are given in Table 4. A comparison of estimates in
Tables 2 and 4 is consistent with implications of the fact that the Cournot
restrictions were not rejected, for signs and even magnitudes of the estimated
parameters are very similar in the two models, as are the equation-specific R2
values.
A different special case of our most general model is that implied by
leader-follower behavior, with GM acting as leader and Ford and Chrysler as
followers; the three restrictions implied by this model are given in (21) for
A2 and A3, and in (28) for A1. As is reported in Table 3, the Wald (quasi-
likelihood ratio) test statistic for these restrictions is 4.614, while the
chi-square critical values are again equal to 4.108 (75% confidence level),
6.251 (90%) and 7.815 (95%). We interpret this finding as suggesting that the
restrictions implied by strategic leader-follower behavior are also consistent
with our data, but are very slightly more binding than those implied by
Cournot behavior; however, the leader/follower restrictions are not
sufficiently tight to warrant outright rejection at 90 or 95% levels of
confidence. In interpreting these test results, recall from our theoretical
discussion that the Ai restrictions appear directly in the MR/MC equation for
each firm, and as seen at the bottom of Table 2, the R2 values in this
equation are all above 0.65, implying that our failure to reject the null
hypothesis decisively does not appear to be due to a simple lack of
explanatory power under the alternative hypothesis. 12 All we can say is that
there is very slightly more support for the Cournot than for the leader-
follower model, although the differential is not decisive. To conserve on
space, therefore, we do not report 3SLS parameters for the estimated leader-
follower model. 13
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Table 4
3SLS PARAMETER ESTIMATES -- PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
WITH COURNOT STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
(Asymptotic t-statistics in Parentheses)
Parameter Variable
Constant
GM
-1010.470
(-5.508) (-10.092)
-5842.790
(-1.914)
-85567.190
(-1.939)
251.750
(0.482)
3796.541
(10.098)
14712.530
(4.414)
83.418
(1.734)
-8.479
(-0.948)
21.059
(3.914)
-19.908
(-0.342)
392.435
(8.312)
756.136
(1.658)
-410.919
(-8.149)
-5.611
(-0.692)
5384.825
(3.334)
-138000.600
(-3.999)
-719.311
(-4.010)
3818.231
(17.041)
6488.521
(8.139)
230.426
(8.457)
-15.280
(-4.174)
5.434
(0.917)
-114.986
(-3.362)
414.929
(10.038)
1447.706
(6.761)
-329.382
(-9.059)
-65.098
(-4.087)
217.129
(0.594)
-11995.660
(-3.110)
-352.769
(-7.031)
3800.762
(25.567)
3020.875
(9.339)
125.754
(7.812)
1.044
(0.567)
-33.750
(-6.616)
-37.189
(-1.609)
348.996
(13.903)
422.822
(6.280)
-162.461
(-6.065)
-129.612
(-5.391)
Ford
-819.943
Chrysler
-305.551
(-11.045)
a11
a1 2
WiW 1
alt
w1y
wit
a2 2 w2w2
a2t
w2y
w2 t
aty toy
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Constrained
Constant
YGM
YFord
YChrysler
GNP
Interest Rate
Unemployment
Gas Price
CPI
Exchange Rate
OTHER STATISTICS
R Mater:
Capit4
Labor
Inver
MR-MC
System E'HH'E - 324.438
MARKUP BEHAVIOR
1970.656 -1859.728
(2.351)
6.621
(1.996)
619.583
(6.955)
-6.621
(-1.996)
9.757
(1.174)
-31.440
(-1.679)
-0.293
(-7.918)
9.559
(5.799)
-20.034
(-9.184)
-0.296
(-2.026)
398.845
(4.323)
-0.004
(-5.909)
ials 0.778
al 0.682
0.290
se Demand 0.950
0.679
(-5.261)
30.790
(4.675)
1001.396
(9.462)
9.092
(1.753)
-30.790
(-4.675)
-73.631
(-3.359)
-0.134
(-2.875)
4.356
(2.183)
-16.721
(-5.729)
-0.886
(-4.929)
78.279
(0.674)
-0.005
(-6.413)
0.723
0.694
0.275
0.990
0.755
Number of Observations Per
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-370.525
(-3.016)
101.348
(7.315)
1529.041
(8.826)
-29.712
(-3.386)
-19.613
(-1.284)
-101.348
(-7.315)
-0.168
(-2.753)
10.742
(3.748)
-27.916
(-5.942)
-1.962
(-7.020)
103.025
(0.557)
-0.004
(-3.411)
0.968
0.023
0.642
0.975
0.901
Equation - 25
We now turn to a discussion of firm-specific estimated returns to scale.
With our normalized quadratic cost function (15), not only are cost function
parameters and estimated returns to scale firm-specific, but they also vary by
observation; our findings suggest that allowing for such diversity among firms
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and over time is important. In Table 5 we report estimated returns to scale
(and estimated standard errors) for five years -- 1959, 1974, 1978, 1980 and
1983, based on the unconstrained, Cournot, and leader/follower behavioral
assumptions.
The first striking result here is that for any year, estimates of firm-
specific returns to scale are remarkably similar across the three models; this
reflects in part the fact that constraints implied by the Cournot and
leader/follower models are reasonably consistent with out data. Second, the
estimated returns to scale are smallest for GM and largest for Chrysler, a
result that is not unexpected given the relative sizes of these firms. Third,
although increasing returns to scale are present for all three firms for most
of the sample, at the very end of the sample in 1983 scale economies changed
to decreasing returns, reflecting perhaps the effects of concerted efforts on
the part of automakers to downsize their manufacturing operations and a
somewhat stronger demand in 1983 relative to the 1981-82 recessionary years.14
Finally, note that these returns to scale calculations hold constant the size
composition of output, and in that sense correspond to ray elasticities.
Elasticities of cost with respect to product mix, as well as other elasticity
estimates based on our estimated unconstrained, Cournot and leader/follower
models, are reported in Table A2 of Appendix III to this paper.1 5
On the demand side, one can use the estimated parameters of the firm-
specific inverse demand functions to calculate a variety of elasticities. One
"very partial" demand elasticity is computed simply by solving the ith firm's
inverse demand equation (32) for, say, yj, and then computing the "very
partial" elasticity 81n yj/81n pi - (ayj/aPi)"(Pi/Yj) - pi/( 6jiyj); other
"very partial" demand elasticities for firm i can be computed analogously.
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Table 5
Estimated Firm-Specific Returns to Scale, Selected Years
Based on Unconstrained and Cournot Behavioral Assumptions
(Estimated Standard Error in Parentheses)
UNCONSTRAINED
YEAR GM FORD CHRY
1959 1.384 1.767 2.446
(.083) (.162) (.163)
1974 1.266 1.432 2.019
(.079) (.105) (.097)
1978 1.101 1.497 1.568
(.134) (.261) (.141)
1980 0.905 1.064 1.158
(.071) (.044) (.037)
1983 0.633 0.758 0.753
(.048) (.056) (.042)
COURNOT
GM FORD
1.410 1.926
(.084) (.171)
1.308 1.557
(.080) (.104)
1.170 1.395
(.132) (.141)
0.936 1.091
(.072) (.044)
0.647 0.817
(.048) (.057)
CHRY
2.506
(.167)
2.065
(.098)
1.628
(.147)
1.166
(.038)
0.768
(.042)
LEADER/FOLLOWER
GM FORD CHRY
1.406 1.894 2.491
(.084) (.162) (.164)
1.304 1.551 2.062
(.080) (.102) (.098)
1.185 1.397 1.631
(.149) (.141) (.148)
0.941 1.084 1.165
(.074) (.043) (.037)
0.652 0.817 0.768
(.050) (.057) (.042)
These estimated elasticities, presented in Table 6 below, are very partial in
the sense that they measure, for example, the effect of a price change on the
quantity demanded for one firm, holding the outputs of other firms fixed as
well as the other macroeconomic shift variables in the demand equations.
As is seen in Table 6, the estimated own-price very partial demand
elasticities are all negative as expected, they indicate demand is elastic,
and that demand is more own-price responsive for GM than for Ford or Chrysler;
furthermore, while outputs from GM and Ford are highly substitutable, those
between Ford and Chrysler, and GM and Chrysler, are complementary. Since both
Ford and GM appear to be highly complementary with Chrysler, whose own price
elasticity of demand is relatively smallest, these elasticity estimates
suggest that relatively few consumers view Chrysler as their primary car, but
- PAGE 23 -
INTERDEPENDENT MARKUP BEHAVIOR - PAGE 24 -
instead view it as a secondary auto that can be used in conjunction with
either Ford or GM as their primary auto.
In terms of other "very partial" output elasticities, a somewhat
surprising result we have is that the demand elasticity with respect to GNP is
negative, and largest (in absolute value) for GM; the elasticity with respect
to the unemployment rate UN is negative, as expected, is largest (in absolute
value) for GM and smallest for Ford. The demand elasticity with respect to
the real interest rate INR is positive whenever INR is positive (INR is
negative in 1974 and 1979), and in these cases it is considerably larger for
GM than for Ford or Chrysler.
In terms of demand responses to real gasoline prices, all elasticity
estimates are negative and substantial; from 1974 onward, GM's products are
particularly GAS price sensitive, while Ford's are least responsive.
Increases in the CPI relative to the GNP deflator, ceteris paribus, increase
demand for products from all three automakers, with GM's demand being
particularly responsive. Finally, the elasticity of demand with respect to
the exchange rate ($/yen) is negative for all three automakers, indicating
that as the US dollar depreciates, the increasingly less expensive Japanese
imports provide stiff competition for domestic automakers; not surprisingly,
this elasticity is largest (in absolute value) for GM, while estimates for
Ford and Chrysler are approximately equal.
It is worth noting that while the results in Table 6 are based on the
estimated unconstrained model, roughly similar findings occur with the Cournot
and leader/follower specifications.
A basic problem with interpreting these "very partial" demand
elasticities is that it is of course entirely unrealistic to expect that
within oligopolistic automobile manufacturing, firms' quantities would be held
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Table 6
Very Partial Output Demand Elasticities
Based on Estimated Unconstrained Model, By Firm, Selected Years
Output Quantity Demand Elasticity With Respect To:
FIRM
GM
1959
1974
1979
1983
FORD
1959
1974
1979
1983
CHRY
1959
1974
1979
1983
PGM
-16.81
-10.68
-12.33
-18.34
15.68
10.44
15.13
20.32
- 9.63
- 5.83
- 8.96
-11.11
PF
5.60
5.59
4.83
7.01
-2.37
-2.48
-2.68
-3.52
-5.91
-5.61
-6.46
-7.81
PC
-3.60
-3.00
-2.54
-3.50
-8.23
-7.18
-7.65
-9.52
-3.98
-3.15
-3.56
-4.09
GNP
-28.67
-19.85
-10.82
-10.63
-2.01
-1.46
-1.00
-0.88
-2.57
-1.69
-1.23
-1.01
INR
3.31
-1.70
-0.29
1.22
0.22
-0.12
-0.03
0.10
0.68
-0.33
-0.08
0.27
UN
-5.31
-3.73
-2.65
-5.26
-0.99
-0.73
-0.65
-1.16
-1.94
-1.30
-1.23
-2.03
GAS
-8.04
-5.65
-4.02
-7.97
-3.15
-1.39
-0.91
-0.80
-8.04
-3.23
-2.23
-1.82
CPI
28.99
19.68
13.30
17.22
0.44
0.31
0.27
0.31
0.98
0.63
0.57
0.61
EXR
-14.27
- 7.07
- 4.34
- 3.78
-2.52
-1.31
-1.01
-0.79
-2.78
-1.31
-1.07
-0.78
fixed even if one automaker changed price. Rather, as outlined in our
theoretical section, profit maximizing firms would recognize their
interdependent product demands, and engage in strategic pricing and markup
behavior. Thus a more useful elasticity calculation is one based on a
"general equilibrium" rather than a "very partial" simulation -- one in which
the reduced form equations are simultaneously solved, corresponding to
situations in which all three firms simultaneously optimize, setting prices,
adjusting production, and varying their markups to maximize profits.
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To compute these general equilibrium output prices and quantities, we
first solve the three inverse demand (32) and the three profit-maximizing
MR/MC markup equations (2) for the three firms' prices and quantities, using
historical data on all the exogenous variables.16 The estimated marginal
costs and optimal markups for the unconstrained, Cournot and leader/follower
models by firm, for selected years, are given in Table 7.17 A number of
results are worth emphasizing.
First, except for 1974, marginal costs are largest for GM under all
three behavioral specifications, and are larger for Ford than Chrysler until
the end of the sample, when their marginal costs are approximately equal.
Second, it is clear from Table 7 that markups vary substantially over
time and among firms, indicating that diversity rather than constancy of
markups characterizes the US automobile industry. Markups are uniformly
larger under Cournot behavior than under unconstrained profit maximization.
Notice also that in the leader/follower specification, markups for GM are
larger than under Cournot, for Ford they are smaller, and for Chrysler they
are very slightly larger. A Driori, one might expect that markups under
leader/follower behavior relative to Cournot conduct would be larger for the
leader (GM), and smaller for both follower firms (Ford and Chrysler). The
small but very slightly larger markups for Chrysler under leader/follower
relative to Cournot are therefore somewhat surprising, but this result does
not indicate that the estimated model is inconsistent with expectations based
on theory. Rather, it is due in large part to the fact that the estimated
technology and demand parameters are different in the leader/follower and
Cournot models; we conjecture that if one used all the Cournot parameters and
in addition constrained A1 according to (28) using the Cournot model estimated
parameters, then profits and markups would be larger for GM and smaller for
both Ford and Chrysler under leader/follower than under Cournot behavior.18
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Table 7
Estimated Firm-Specific Marginal Costs and Markups, Selected Years
Based on Unconstrained, Cournot and Leader/Follower Behavioral Assumptions
(Standard Error in Parentheses)
Estimated Marginal Cost (1975$)
FORD CHRYSLER
A A
Estimated Markup (P - MC) (1975$)
FORD CHRYSLER
Unconstrained Generalized Profit Maximization
1959 6941.50 4560.09 4083.75
(415.09) (417.43) (271.46)
1974 3631.57 4246.03 2719.10
(226.58) (312.41) (130.59)
1979 4307.18
(510.52)
1983 6168.50
(469.23)
3637.30 3327.64
(387.03) (161.78)
4652.15 4740.48
(345.81) (262.27)
321.45 803.96 1091.16
(279.94) (347.71) (178.48)
397.46 925.03 1254.74
(346.13) (400.08) (205.23)
511.20 912.77 1295.41
(445.18) (394.77) (211.89)
391.02 758.55 1290.27
(340.52) (328.07) (211.05)
Cournot Profit Maximization
1959 6815.27
(406.08)
4183.16 3984.82
(371.95) (265.29)
480.54 1234.98 1193.26
(240.79) (264.14) (163.12)
1974 3516.17 3905.48 2658.28 594.18 1420.97 1372.15
(214.65) (259.58) (126.34) (297.73) (303.92) (187.57)
1979 4069.02
(479.67)
1983 6031.81
(452.08)
3228.31 3261.60
(325.73) (157.14)
4317.45 4651.52
(300.56) (255.70)
764.21 1402.13 1416.64
(382.93) (299.89) (193.65)
584.55 1165.23 1411.01
(292.91) (249.22) (192.88)
Leader-Follower Profit Maximization
1959 6835.85 4254.20 4010.18 510.58 1221.02 1195.28
(407.17) (363.07) (263.50) (263.78) (265.52) (164.93)
1974 3525.08 3922.75 2662.53
(216.68) (258.79) (126.26)
631.31 1404.90 1374.47
(326.15) (305.51) (189.65)
1979 4015.91 3224.01 3261.37 811.97 1386.28 1419.03
(491.48) (325.76) (157.14) (419.49) (301.46) (195.80)
1983 5984.92 4317.23
(461.29) (300.60)
4651.85 621.08 1152.05 1413.39
(255.70) (320.87) (250.52) (195.02)
YEAR
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Third, on an absolute basis, markups are smallest for GM, and under
unconstrained profit maximization, they are largest for Chrysler; when Cournot
or leader/follower behavior is assumed, however, approximately equal markups
occur for Ford and Chrysler for most years, with Chrysler improving relative to
Ford towards the end of the sample. Since Chrysler's marginal costs are
smallest for most of the sample, on a percentage basis the markups presented in
Table 7 are typically largest for Chrysler and smallest for GM.
Finally, in all cases the differentials in markups between GM and the
other two firms are much less than differences in marginal costs, particularly
in the case of unconstrained general profit maximization. This suggests that
GM may well be experiencing significant constraints upon its pricing behavior,
constraints not adequately modeled using simple Cournot and leader/follower
frameworks. One possibility is that we may be observing a situation in which
GM sets its price and Ford and Chrysler act as a quasi-competitive fringe. In
view of the uniformly higher marginal cost differentials than price
differentials between GM and its rivals, this suggests that Ford and Chrysler
may be adapting to GM's prices and exploiting their relative cost
differentials. A detailed analysis of such Bertrand-type price-setting (rather
than Cournot quantity-setting) behavior is of great interest and is currently
underway, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.
In view of the high variability of the marginal cost and markup values
over the sample period, it is useful to consider how output prices, output
quantities, and markups have responded to supply and demand shocks that shift
the cost and inverse demand functions. The cyclical nature of markup behavior
has been the subject of considerable recent controversy. Although the
conventional wisdom has been that in periods of slack demand, firms are more
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willing to cut prices to maintain market share, 1 9 the recent "revisionist"
literature argues that in periods of booms, firms may believe that the
penalties for cheating are less, and that they can better afford to cut prices
to increase market share. 2 0
To examine this issue more closely using our micro data, we compute
reduced form general equilibrium elasticities of output price, output quantity,
marginal cost and markup with respect to the exogenous macro-economic variables
in the inverse demand functions. More specifically, using historical data on
all the exogenous variables and our 3SLS estimated parameters, we solved the
nine inverse demand, MR/MC and marginal cost equations for nine endogenous
variables -- output price, output quantity, and marginal cost, for each of the
three firms. We then increased one of the exogenous macro-economic variables
in the inverse demand equation by 1%, obtained a new set of firms' prices,
quantities, marginal costs and markups, and then computed an arc elasticity.
We did this for each of the six macroeconomic exogenous variables, using
parameter estimates from all three models; to conserve space, in Tables 8 and 9
we report results from these "reduced form" general equilibrium elasticity
computations for only the unconstrained profit maximization model.2 1 Several
comments are worth noting.
First, to us the most striking finding from these tables is the diversity
in elasticity estimates -- both among firms and over time. This diversity
suggests that imposing constancy over time, or equality among firms on markup
behavior masks substantial heterogeneity. In the top panel of Table 8, for
example, we see that output quantity elasticities tend to have the same sign
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Table 8
Reduced Form General Equilibrium Output Quantity and Price Elasticities
Based on Estimated Unconstrained Model, By Firm, Selected Years
FIRM Output Quantity Elasticities with Respect To:
CM
1959
1974
1979
1983
FORD
1959
1974
1979
1983
CHRYSLER
1959
1974
1979
1983
GNP
1.34
1.11
1.04
0.75
3.81
8.59
11.36
4.39
24.48
-4.52
-2.08
-2.31
INR
0.02
-0.01
-0.00
0.01
-0.32
0.54
0.22
-0.37
-2.74
-0.37
-0.05
0.26
UN GAS
0.11
0.09
0.11
0.17
0.62
1.41
2.44
1.90
7.55
-1.41
-0.85
-1.90
-1.23
-0.62
-0.55
-0.40
-1.86
-2.56
-3.22
-1.24
-10.20
-1.15
-0.50
-0.56
CPI
-1.03
-0.84
-0.98
-0.93
-4.63
-10.22
-16.75
-8.52
-21.59
3.91
2.23
3.26
EXR
0.99
0.59
0.62
0.40
1.18
1.90
2.82
0.97
15.22
-2.01
-1.04
-1.02
Output Price Elasticities with Respect To:
GM
1959
1974
1979
1983
)RD
1959
1974
1979
1983
CHRYSLER
1959
1974
1979
GNP
0.05
0.08
0.04
0.02
-3.07
-1.71
-1.18
-0.85
0.73
0.86
0.61
INR
0.00
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
0.26
-0.11
-0.02
0.07
-0.08
0.07
0.02
UN GAS
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
-0.50
-0.28
-0.25
-0.37
0.23
0.27
0.25
-0.04
-0.04
-0.02
-0.01
1.50
0.51
0.33
0.24
0.31
0.22
0.15
CPI
-0.04
-0.06
-0.04
-0.03
3.73
2.03
1.73
1.64
-0.65
-0.75
-0.65
-0.04 0.28 0.08 -0.49
EXR
-0.95
-0.38
-0.29
-0.19
-0.95
-0.38
-0.29
-0.19
0.46
0.38
0.30
0.15
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Table 9
Reduced Form General Equilibrium Marginal Cost and Markup Elasticities
Based on Estimated Unconstrained Model, By Firm, Selected Years
Marginal Cost Elasticities with Respect To:
GNP
-0.04
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
-11.59
-3.34
-2.13
-1.64
2.83
9.56
49.21
2.83
INR
-0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.00
0.97
-0.21
-0.04
0.14
-0.32
0.79
1.29
-0.32
UN GAS
-0.00
-0.01
-0.00
-0.00
-1.88
-0.55
-0.46
-0.71
0.87
2.99
20.13
2.33
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.01
5.67
0.99
0.60
0.47
1.18
2.43
11.88
0.68
CPI
0.03
0.05
0.03
0.02
14.06
3.97
3.15
3.19
-2.50
-8.27
-52.77
-3.99
-0.03
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
-3.57
-0.74
-0.53
-0.36
1.76
4.25
24.64
1.25
Markup Elasticities with Respect To:
GNP
1.37
1.17
1.08
0.77
17.42
12.34
13.78
6.13
21.05
-12.85
-34.37
-5.00
INR
0.02
-0.01
-0.00
0.01
-1.28
0.75
0.27
-0.50
-2.43
-1.16
-1.33
0.57
UN GAS
0.11
0.10
0.12
0.17
2.54
1.97
2.91
2.63
6.62
-4.28
-17.47
-4.14
-1.26
-0.66
-0.57
-0.41
-7.13
-3.52
-3.80
-1.70
8.92
-3.49
-11.07
-1.23
CPI
-1.06
-0.88
-1.01
-0.95
-16.38
-13.65
-12.29
-11.36
-19.58
13.27
116.46
7.56
1.02
0.62
0.64
0.41
4.92
2.65
3.37
1.33
13.22
-6.00
-20.60
-2.25
FIRM
1959
1974
1979
1983
FORD
1959
1974
1979
1983
CHRYSLER
1959
1974
1979
1983
GM
1959
1974
1979
1983
FORD
1959
1974
1979
1983
CHRYSLER
1959
1974
1979
1983
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for GM and Ford, but these often differ from Chrysler; output quantity
elasticity estimates differ in sign among automakers for the UN, CPI and EXR
variables, but have the same (negative) sign in the case of GAS. The
idiosyncratic 1959 estimates for Chrysler reflect in part a computational
difficulty we experienced in obtaining a reduced-form solution to Chrysler's
output price, output quantity and markup equations in that year.
More specifically, as seen in the top panel of Table 8, while GM's and
Ford's output reacts positively to GNP, the elasticity of Ford's output is
considerably larger than GM's; moreover, except for 1959, Chrysler's output
exhibits a consistently large but negative elasticity of output with respect to
GNP. In terms of other macroeconomic variables, GM and Ford have the same
qualitative response of output with respect to UN (positive) and CPI
(negative), although Ford's output responses are more volatile. The response
of output with respect to EXR ($/yen) also varies by firm. When EXR increases,
Japanese imports become more expensive in terms of US dollars, ceteris paribus,
the output of GM and Ford increases (consumers view GM and Ford as being
substitutes for Japanese imports), while that of Chrysler decreases (Chrysler
products being complementary to Japanese imports).
Second, as seen in the bottom panel of Table 8, for all firms the reduced
form general equilibrium output price elasticities are much smaller in absolute
magnitude than output quantity elasticities. Moreover, in many cases these
output price elasticity estimates vary in sign among automakers.
Turning to the top panel of Table 9 where we report marginal cost
elasticity estimates, we again are struck by the diversity. GM's marginal
costs are least responsive to macro-economic supply and demand shocks, and
elasticity estimates for Chrysler often differ in sign from GM and Ford. If
one interprets the marginal cost elasticity with respect to GAS as reflecting
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supply shocks, for all three automakers these elasticity estimates are
positive, as expected.
Finally, in the bottom panel of Table 9 we report reduced form general
equilibrium markup elasticities. In Appendix II to thise paper we show that
even in models much simpler than ours, the predicted signs of these markup
elasticities with respect to supply and/or demand shocks are often ambiguous.
Thus, economic theory provides little guidance on what to expect here, and
instead we must address these issues empirically. In general, we again find
considerable diversity, with sign estimates being the same for GM and Ford, but
different for Chrysler. In particular, for GM and Ford, we find that markup
elasticities with respect to real GNP are positive, lending support to the
"conventional wisdom"; such is not the case, however, for Chrysler. Hence,
depending on the firm being analyzed, we find support for both the
"conventional wisdom" and "revisionist" literatures. Markup elasticity
estimates with respect to UN and EXR are positive for GM and Ford, and those
for Ford are larger in absolute value, suggesting that Ford has a more volatile
markup behavior; for Chrysler, these elasticity estimates are negative. Except
for Chrysler in 1959, markup elasticity estimates with respect to GAS are
always negative, suggesting that increases in real gas prices, ceteris paribus,
impose substantial pressures on the profitability of all three U.S. automakers.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our purpose in this paper has been to implement empirically, using firm-
specific data from the US automobile industry, a model sufficiently general to
permit the testing of a variety of specific behavioral postulates associated
with the strategic profit maximizing behavior of GM, Ford and Chrysler. We
find that our 1959-1983 data are consistent with both a Cournot quantity-
setting set of constraints, and with the restrictions implied by
leader/follower behavior, with GM acting as leader; although neither set of
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restrictions is rejected at usual levels of significance, the constraints
implied by the leader/follower model are slightly more binding than those
associated with Cournot behavior. In terms of the cyclical analysis of markup
behavior, our most striking result is the great diversity of behavior we find
among GM, Ford and Chrysler. Depending on which firm is being analyzed, there
is support for the pro-cyclical conventional wisdom of markups (GM and Ford),
as well as for the counter-cyclical revisionist literature (Chrysler).
Diversity, rather than constancy and homogeneity, best characterizes this
industry.
Our research can be extended in a number of ways. First, we have
examined only the Cournot-type quantity-setting models, and have not developed
a framework for assessing Bertrand-type price-setting models. We are currently
working on developing and estimating such price-setting models, and comparing
them with results from this paper.
Second, data limitations have precluded us from developing a framework
for introducing the strategic behavior of Japanese automakers explicitly into
our analysis of the US auto market (although our inverse demand equation does
account for changes in the dollar/yen exchange rate). That would seem to be a
useful and informative research topic, but data issues could be somewhat
difficult to overcome.
Third, although our data have been constructed with care, we well realize
that the reliability of our firm-specific data series can be called into
question, especially for the capital stock estimates. In this paper we have
used a long-run cost function with capital price rather than capital stock as a
regressor, thereby attempting to mitigate measurement error problems. A useful
direction for future research would be to specify instead a short-run cost
function where capital is quasi-fixed and attempt to deal directly with
econometric problems associated with measurement error.
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Finally, our measure of output has taken product mix into account by
including an hedonic adjustment, but a more satisfying procedure would involve
specifying and estimating a model in which the various sizes would be treated
as distinct outputs. Because such a model would necessarily involve a
considerable increase in the number of parameters to be estimated, however, its
implementation would require increasing the number of observations, and thus
our 1959-83 data would need to be updated, and perhaps even extended backwards
before 1959.
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APPENDIX I: DATA SOURCES AND DATA CONSTRUCTION
The data set for this study consists of annual data from 1959-1983, taken
primarily from that originally constructed and employed by Ana Aizcorbe,
Clifford Winston and Ann F. Friedlaender [1987] and extended by us. We now
describe this data set and our extensions to it; a more detailed description of
the original data is given in Aizcorbe, Winston and Friedlaender [1987,
especially pp. 22-32].
Data on labor quantity (number of domestic employees) were available from
Moody's and Standard & Poor for Chrysler and Ford, while GM provided data on
its domestic employment. Annual compensation data for domestic employees of
each of the automakers were obtained from the United Auto Workers.
Because data on the cost of materials purchased by domestic plants were
not available, it was necessary to employ series on the materials purchases by
domestic operations. Following Aizcorbe, Winston and Friedlaender, we assume
that from 1959 to 1983 the ratio of domestic materials purchases to domestic
sales was the same as the ratio of worldwide materials purchases to worldwide
sales. To mitigate problems of double-counting and in interpreting transfer
prices in these vertically integrated firms, we employed as our measure of
materials prices the average cost in dollars per pound of materials purchased
by each automaker.
The capital rental price measure takes taxes and expected inflation into
account, as outlined in Aizcorbe, Winston and Friedlaender [1987, pp. 27-30].
Although the tax rate and expected inflation variables are common among the
three firms (the latter calculated using an adaptive expectations
representation), the cost of financing is firm-specific and is computed as a
weighted average of the cost of borrowing and the cost of equity, where the
latter is estimated using a capital asset pricing model. Based on firms'
financial data from domestic operations and assuming that retained earnings
INTERDEPENDENT MARKUP BEHAVIOR - PAGE 37 -
approximate economic profits, total domestic costs were computed as sales minus
net earnings plus dividends. The total capital costs were then calculated as
total domestic costs minus labor costs and materials costs, and capital
quantity was then constructed as total capital costs divided by the rental
price of capital.
For each of the three firms, input prices were transformed into constant
1975$ by dividing the input price measure by the GNP deflator. Sample means,
minimum and maximum values, and standard deviations for the three input price
and quantity measures for each of the automakers are presented in Table 1 in
the main text of this paper. There it is seen that while average materials
prices were lowest for GM and highest for Chrysler, average labor and capital
prices were the exact opposite, being highest for GM and lowest for Chrysler.
The output price and quantity data were constructed in two steps. First,
output quantity data were obtained as the number of autos produced, with an
adjustment made for calendar year vs. model year. The corresponding output.
price measure was then computed as average revenue, i.e., the dollar value of
sales divided by the number of autos produced.
The problem with both these measures is that they fail to take into
account the changing composition of automobile production among small,
intermediate and large models. Although we have a preference for specifying a
model that treats these various size classes as distinct outputs, our
relatively small time series of data does not permit such a rich
parameterization, and thus we compromise by employing an hedonic approach that
facilitates a more parsimonious parameterization.
Specifically, we ran a pooled Box-Cox regression equation for the three
automakers in which a real average revenue variable (average revenue divided by
the GNP deflator) was regressed on a series of annual time dummies, firm-
specific dummy variables for Ford and Chrysler, and firm-specific product mix
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variables for Ford and Chrysler, where the latter were defined as the share of
large models (gross vehicle weight greater than 3,000 pounds) in total vehicle
production by firm. To avoid problems of scaling, we divided the dependent
variable by the sample geometric mean. Using maximum likelihood estimation, we
obtained an estimate of the Box-Cox transformation parameter equal to 2.71,
with a large-sample standard error of 0.87. Note that a 95% confidence
interval would barely include A - 1.00, the traditional linear specification.
Based on this Box-Cox regression, for each observation we set the
stochastic disturbance term to zero and then computed the predicted value by
reversing the Box-Cox transformation,
A
A A A
Pit - (A'Xit + 1 )
A
where p is the estimated Box-Cox transformation parameter. To normalize
A
these quality-adjusted prices, we divided each Pit by the predicted value for
GM in 1975, and thereby obtained normalized quality-adjusted real price indexes
for GM, Ford and Chrysler. These price indexes are given in Table Al below.
Finally, to obtain a consistent measure of real output quantity adjusted
for compositional changes, we divided constant dollars sales by the above
composition-adjusted price of output. Sample means, minimum and maximum
values, and standard deviations for the output quantity, output price and
product mix variables are presented for each of the three firms in Table 1 in
the main text. Note that after adjusting for size composition, average car
prices among automakers are approximately equal; GM's average prices are
smallest while those from Chrysler are largest.22
Last of all, a common set of variables was specified as being exogenous
to the firm-specific demand equations. These exogenous variables included real
GNP, a real interest rate (INR), the unemployment rate (UN), real gasoline
prices (GAS), the ratio of the consumer price index to the GNP deflator (CPI),
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Table Al
Hedonic Quality-Adjusted Real Price Indexes for GM, Ford and Chrysler
with GM's 1975 Size Composition as Numeraire
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
0.9686
0.8931
0.8721
0.9106
0.8902
0.8974
0.9705
0.9689
0.9642
0.9622
1.0517
0.9750
1.0619
1.0550
0.9883
0.8739
1.0000
0.9954
1.0508
1.0167
1.0214
1.0299
1.0609
1.1590
1.1315
FORD
0.8918
0.7867
0.7510
0.8136
0.8002
0.8392
0.9452
0.9488
0.9518
0.9346
1.0158
0.9429
1.0454
1.0377
0.9569
0.8651
0.9762
0.9643
1.0194
0.9989
1.0146
1.0304
1.0627
1.1309
1.1113
CHRYSLER
0.8288
0.7972
0.7633
0.8300
0.7884
0.7844
0.8611
0.8600
0.8588
0.8524
0.9495
0.8781
0.9929
0.9853
0.8997
0.7066
0.8888
0.8768
0.9449
0.9469
0.9510
0.9993
1.0462
1.1389
1.1059
and the US-Japan exchange rate, defined as the number of US dollars per 1,000
Japanese yen (EXR). Summary statistics for these common demand variables are
presented in Table 1 in the text.
- PAGE 39 -
INTERDEPENDENT MARKUP BEHAVIOR - PAGE 40 -
APPENDIX II:
A STYLIZED FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING CYCLICAL VARIATIONS IN MARKUPS23
In this appendix we present stylized models of markup behavior that
assist us in interpreting empirical findings on the markup elasticity behavior
of GM, Ford and Chrysler. We begin with the case of a monopolist, and then
consider three types of frameworks for oligopolists.
For simplification, assume a monopolist faces a quadratic cost function
and a linear demand function, and that it produces a single output y, utilizing
a single input whose price is w. Write the monopolist's inverse demand
function as
p - a - by + u (Al)
where a and b are positive parameters, and u represents a composite exogenous
demand effect. Since the cost function is quadratic, the marginal cost
function can be expressed as
mc - cw + dy + v (A2)
where c and d are assumed to be positive parameters and v represents a
compositie exogenous supply effect independent of input prices. Thus v can be
interpreted as an exogenous technological shock, while unexpected changes in w
can be interpreted as input price shocks.
Assuming the monopolist acts so as to maximize profits, we obtain the
following reduced-form expressions for optimal output y*, optimal marginal cost
mc , and the optimal price-marginal cost markup * :24 :
y - (a + u - cw - v)/(2b + d) (A3)
mc - (2bcw + da + du + 2bv)/(2b + d) (A4)
p (p* - mc*)/mc
- by /(dy* + cw + v) - b/[d + (cw + v)/y*)]. (A5)
Notice that dy /du > 0, dy*/dv < 0, while sign (dmc*/du) - sign (dmc /dv) -
sign [d/(2b + d)]. From this, we can conclude that a positive demand shock (du
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> 0) will increase the monopolist's output level and markup, while a positive
supply shock (dv > 0) will have the opposite effect.25 If the monopolist is
producing under increasing returns to scale, then d < 0, and the response of
its output and markup to a supply or demand shock is the same as that if it
produces under increasing costs (d > 0). However, the reponse of marginal
costs will be affected by the returns to scale since a positive demand shock u
will cause marginal costs to increase or decrease depending on whether the firm
producers under increasing or decreasing costs. 26
While the response of a monopolist to demand or supply shocks is rather
intuitive, the response of oligopolists is less so. To obtain an understanding
of the nature of these responses in oligopolistic markets, we find it useful to
consider the behavior of duopolies using three different behavioral
assumptions: 27 (i) both firms act as Cournot quantity setters; (ii) one firm
acts as a leader and the other as a follower; and (iii) firms act as Cournot
quantity setters in a world of asymmetric information.
(i) Cournot. Assume that the firms under consideration produce close
substitutes yl and Y2, and that they each face linear demand functions of the
form
Yl - allp 1 + a1 2P2 + ul (A6)
Y2 - a2 1P1 + a2 2p 2 + u2  (A7)
where all aij's are constant and ul and u2 represent exogenous influences on
demand. From the regularity conditions, we knoww that aii < 0 and aij > 0
(ifj), and that D = alla 22 - a12a21 > 0. The inverse demand functions take the
form
pl - (a22Y 1 - a1 2Y2 - a2 2ul + al2u2)/D (A8)
P2 - (-a21Y 1 + allY2 + a21ul - allu 2)/D. (A9)
Now let each firm operate with a linear marginal cost function, having the form
mci - blw i + b2Y i + ei (A10)
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where bl and b2 are constant across firms, and ei represents a firm-specific
exogenous supply effect. Note that if the firms in the industry are producing
under increasing marginal costs, then b2 > 0, and conversely, if they are
producing under increasing returns to scale.
If each firm acts as a Cournot quantity setter, it sets its marginal cost
equal to its marginal revenue, assuming a fixed output of the other firm.
Setting mci - mri (i - 1,2) and solving the resulting system of equations for
each firm's equilibrium level of output yields the following equilibrium output
levels for each firm:
Y1 - A1E1 + A2E2 + A3ul + A4u2  (All)
Y2 - B1E1 + B2E2 + B3ul + B4u2  (A12)
where
Ei = blwi + ei, i - 1,2
Al - D*(2all - Db2)/D1 < 0
A2 = al2D/D1 > 0
A3 = [D*(l - a2 2b2 ) + alla 2 2 ]/D1 > 0
A4 - al2 (Db2 - all)/D 1 > 0
B1 = a2 1D/D1 > 0
B2 = D-(2a 2 2 - Db2 )/D1 < 0
B3 = a2 1 (Db2 - a2 2 )/D1 > 0
B4 - [D(l - allb2 ) + alla 2 2 ]/D1 > 0
D1 - (4a2 2all - a1 2a21) - 2Db2 (all + a2 2 ) + D2b2 (A13)
Given these sign inequalities, we can see from (All) and (A12) that a positive
demand shock that affects one firm (dui > 0) will increase the equilibrium
output of both firms. By contrast, a supply shock that adversely affects the
costs of one firm (e.g., dE1 > 0) will lower the equilibrium output of that
firm while raising the output of its competitor.28
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While changes in the microeconomic environment can cause firm-specific
demand or supply shocks, changes in the macroeconomic environment should affect
both firms. Thus it is useful to analyze the response of each firm to
simultaneous shifts in each firm's demand function (dul - du2 = du > 0) and in
each firm's marginal cost function (dE1 - dE2 = dE > 0). Such demand shifts
could arise due to a booming economy, while supply shifts could also occur from
such a boom or an exogenous increase in input prices, such as the energy price
shocks that affected the US economy during the 1970's.
In the case of a demand shock, since dyi/dul and dyi/du2 are each
positive, it is clear that a general demand shock will increase the equilibrium
output of both firms. In contrast, a general supply shock has an ambiguous
impact, since as noted above an individual supply shock affects each firm in
opposite directions. Nevertheless, there is a presumption that the impact of a
general supply shock on output is negative, since
dy i /dE - D(aij + 2aii - Db2)/D1 .  (A14)
Thus, unless the cross demand effect (aij) is very large relative to the own
demand effect (aii), dyi/dE < 0.
It is also clear that both firms' prices will rise from a positive demand
shock, since a rise in firm l's prices due to an outward shift in its demand
function will cause firm 2's demand curve to shift out due to the relative
price effect. Similarly, a positive supply shock on the part of firm 1 will
cause its price to rise and its output to fall. This in turn will shift firm
2's demand curve outward, causing its output and price to rise. Thus it is
clear that a simultaneous demand shock will cause both firms' outputs and
prices to rise. By contrast, a simultaneous supply shock will unambiguously
cause both firms' prices to rise, while having a likely (but not necessarily)
net reduction in their outputs. Hence, while the price effects are
unambiguously procyclical in the case of both demand and supply shocks, the
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output effects are unambiguously procyclical in the case of demand shocks and
are likely to be countercyclical in the case of supply shocks.
Let us now consider the response of markups -- p - (p* - mc )/mc -- to
demand or supply shocks. In the case of this duopoly, the markup for each firm
is given by the following expression:
i - (-aii/D)/[b 2 + Ei/yl(Ei,Ej,ulu 2)]. (Al5)
Since a positive demand shock unambiguously causes each firm's output to rise,
a demand shock will also cause each firm's markup to increase. By contrast, a
supply shock that raises costs will cause the markup to fall since Ei rises and
y falls. If a macroeconomic boom is characterized by both positive demand
and supply (input price) shocks, it follows that the net effect of such a boom
on a firm's markup is ambiguous, since positive demand shocks and input price
effects have opposite impacts upon each firm's markup relative to marginal
costs.
It is important to note that this analysis has been based on the
assumption that the firms in the industry operate under increasing marginal
costs, which occurs when there are decreasing returns to scale. If firms
instead operate under constant marginal costs (b2 - 0), the results given above
will not change since the signs of the coefficients of the equilibrium output
equations given in equations (All) and (A12) will not be affected. If,
however, the firms operate under decreasing marginal costs (b2 < 0), then it is
generally impossible to sign the relevant expressions since the sign of the
numerators containing b2 generally becomes ambiguous.29 Thus, we cannot derive
general conclusions about the impact of supply or demand shocks in the presence
of decreasing marginal costs; the effects of these shocks depend on the
parameter values of the underlying cost and demand functions.
(ii) Leader/follower. Any extension of the formal analysis beyond the
Cournot model quickly becomes very messy analytically. Nonetheless, we can
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obtain an understanding of the economic issues underlying differences between
the behavior in a Cournot and in a leader/follower framework by considering a
simple example. Specifically, assume that the demand functions are given by
the following expressions,
Y1 -"4p + p2 + ul (A16)
Y2 - 2 *p1 - P2 + u2 , (A17)
and that each firm's marginal cost is given by
mci - Yi + ei, i - 1,2. (A18)
In this case we can show that the Cournot equilibrium is given by
Yl - (-10el + e2 + 4ul + 3u2 )/19 (A19)
Y2 - (2el - 4e2 + 3ul + 7u2 )/19, (A20)
while the leader/follower equilibrium has the form
Yl - (-10el + e2 + 4ul + 3u2 )/18 (A21)
Y2 - el/9 - 19e 2/90 + 7ul/47 + 11u2/30. (A22)
From this we see that relative to the Cournot solution, each of the leader's
coefficients are larger in absolute value, and each of the follower's
coefficients are smaller. This implies, in turn, that the leader's output will
be more volatile and that the follower's output will be less volatile, in
response to all types of shocks. This occurs because the greater monopoly
power of the leader enables it to exploit more of supply or demand shifts
caused by the shock -- whether positive or negative.
(iii) Asymmetric Information. To this point we have analyzed market
behavior in a world in which the various firms may be myopic, but in which the
market acts as though there is full information about each firm's cost and
demand functions. Typically, however, instead of there being full information
about the structure of costs and demands, one finds incomplete or asymmetric
information. Thus it is useful to analyze a simple example in which asymmetric
information exists, and then compare it to the case in which full information
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occurs. We now show that the effects of demand or supply shocks on output
levels and firm markups will be smoothed in the presence of asymmetric
information.
To see this, consider a world of Cournot quantity setters, and let us now
compare the equilibria in the presence of full and asymmetric information.
Assume initially that in firm l's marginal cost function (A10), el - 1 and that
after the supply shock el - 0. Moreover, both firms know that e2 - 0. If both
firms act as Cournot competitors with full information, the equilibrium outputs
turn out to be
eI - 1: Y1 - (-10 + 4u1 + 3u2 )/19 Y2 - ( 2 + 3ul + 7u2 )/19 (A23)
el - 0: y1 - (4ul + 3u2 )/19 Y2 - (3ul + 7u2)/19. (A24)
Thus, as a result of the fall in el from one to zero, firm l's output will rise
by 10/19, while that of firm 2 will fall by 2/19.
Under asymmetric information, firm 1 knows that el falls from one to
zero, while firm 2 believes with probability 4 that el - 1 and with probability
1 - 4 that el - 0. Let ylL denote firm l's output when el - 1 and ylH denote
firm l's output when el - 0. The respective MR/MC equilibrium conditions for
firm 1 are given by
-ylL - .5Y2 + .5(ul + u2 ) " Y1 + 1 (A25)
-ylH - .5Y2 + .5(ul + u2 ) - Y1. (A26)
Since an expected profit-maximizing firm 2 does not know firm l's supply
structure, it applies the following MR/MC equilibrium condition:
0('YlL - 5y2 + ul + 2u2 ) + (1 - )(-'YlH - 5y2 + ul + 2u 2 ) - Y 2. (A27)
The solution to this Bayesian game is given as follows:
ylH - -.5 + 4/38 + 4ul/19 + 3u2/19 (A28)
YlL - -4/38 + 4u1/19 + 3u2/19 (A29)
Y2 - 24/19 + 3ul/19 + 7u2/19. (A30)
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When el - 0, firm 1 increases its output by 10/19 in a world of full
information, while in a world of asymmetric information, it increased its
output by 10/19 - .5 + 0/38. Since .5 > 0/38, firm l's change in output is
greater in the world of full information. Similarly, in a full information
environment, firm 2's output falls by 2/19 while in a world of asymmetric
information its output falls by (1 - 0).2/19. Thus in both cases, a supply
shock reducing the costs of firm 1 generates smaller shifts in output when
there is asymmetric information, i.e. asymmetric information smooths the
impacts of supply shocks on equilibrium output levels. This arises because the
uninformed firm will always produce an average level of output to minimize its
potential losses under asymmetric information.
Although the specific responses of output, prices and markups will vary
with the specific market structure, the above analysis suggests that positive
demand shocks (either firm-specific or general) will cause the output, prices
and markups of all firms to rise. Similarly, a general supply shock will tend
to reduce the outputs and markups of the firms in the market, while
simultaneously increasing prices. By contrast, a positive supply shock to a
specific firm will tend to reduce its output and markup while increasing the
output and markup of its competitor. Finally, to the extent that booms are
characterized by simultaneous positive cost and demand shocks, we cannot
predict whether the response of the markup will be pro- or counter-cyclical.
If demand shocks are large relative to cost shocks, then it is likely that
markups will rise with booms. If, however, cost shocks are large relative to
demand shocks, the opposite will occur. This suggests that cost inflation will
generally be accompanied by falling markups, while demand inflation will
generally be accompanied by rising markups.
Of course, these results must be adapted if any of the firms in the
industry operate undering decreasing marginal costs and increasing returns to
INTERDEPENDENT MARKUP BEHAVIOR - PAGE 48 -
scale. Specifically, in such a case, the theoretical results obtained above
must be qualified, since the actual market response depends on particular
parameter values -- specifically, the extent of decreasing marginal costs
relative to the own and cross-demand effects.
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APPENDIX III
Table A2
Estimated Firm-Specific Technology Elasticities, Selected Years
Based on Unconstrained, Cournot and Leader/Follower Behavioral Assumptions
Elastic-
ity
eC,MIX U
C
F
IMM U
C
F
EMK
EML
'MY
£M,MIX U
C
F
eKM
eKK
eKL
eKY
Model GM
Assn. 1959 1974 1983
1.10 0.38 -0.01
1.12 0.39 -0.02
1.11 0.39 -0.01
-0.28 -0.07 -0.21
-0.29 -0.08 -0.23
-0.29 -0.08 -0.23
0.08
0.08
0.07
0.20
0.21
0.22
0.92
0.90
0.89
0.95
0.94
0.95
0.18
0.18
0.16
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.79
0.77
0.76
0.48
0.47
0.48
0.08
0.08
0.07
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.19
0.21
0.21
1.32
1.30
1.28
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.07
0.07
0.06
-0.59 -0.18 -0.08
-0.56 -0.17 -0.08
-0.56 -0.17 -0.07
0.41 0.11 0.01
0.38 0.10 0.00
0.40 0.10 0.01
1.09 1.54 0.82
1.05 1.47 0.79
1.03 1.45 0.77
FORD
1959 1974 1983
-0.89 -0.07 0.06
-0.97 -0.07 0.07
-0.94 -0.07 0.07
-0.62 -0.30 -0.50
-0.62 -0.30 -0.50
-0.62 -0.30 -0.50
-0.24 -0.04 -0.08
-0.24 -0.04 -0.08
-0.24 -0.04 -0.08
0.86 0.34 0.58
0.86 0.34 0.58
0.86 0.34 0.58
0.77 0.67 0.99
0.76 0.66 0.98
0.76 0.66 0.98
0.58 0.20 0.12
0.58 0.19 0.12
0.58 0.19 0.12
-0.58 -0.10 -0.25
-0.59 -0.11 -0.26
-0.59 -0.11 -0.26
-0.99 -0.06 -0.18
-0.95 -0.06 -0.18
-0.94 -0.06 -0.17
1.57 0.17 0.44
1.53 0.17 0.43
1.53 0.16 0.43
0.36 0.12 0.25
0.20 0.06 0.14
0.19 0.06 0.13
CHRYSLER
1959 1974 1983
0.10 0.09 0.13
0.09 0.09 0.13
0.10 0.10 0.13
-0.21 -0.08 -0.27
-0.20 -0.07 -0.26
-0.21 -0.07 -0.26
-0.34 -0.06 -0.18
-0.34 -0.06 -0.18
-0.34 -0.06 -0.17
0.55 0.13 0.45
0.54 0.13 0.44
0.54 0.13 0.44
0.77 0.63 1.44
0.77 0.62 1.43
0.77 0.62 1.43
0.80 0.35 0.13
0.81 0.36 0.13
0.81 0.36 0.13
-0.70 -0.24 -0.64
-0.69 -0.24 -0.63
-0.69 -0.24 -0.63
0.11 0.02 0.04
0.11 0.02 0.04
0.11 0.02 0.04
0.59 0.22 0.60
0.58 0.22 0.59
0.58 0.22 0.59
-0.74 -0.59 -0.99
-0.78 -0.61 -1.04
-0.78 -0.61 -1.04
PAGE 49 -
INTERDEPENDENT MARKUP BEHAVIOR
eK,MIX U
C
F
ElM
ELK
ELL
'L,MIX UC
F
-0.16 -0.13 -0.03
-0.27 -0.22 -0.06
-0.24 -0.19 -0.05
0.27 0.05 0.29
0.29 0.06 0.31
0.30 0.06 0.31
0.24 0.02 0.00
0.22 0.02 0.00
0.23 0.02 0.00
-0.51 -0.07 -0.29
-0.51 -0.07 -0.31
-0.53 -0.07 -0.31
0.24 0.67 2.29
0.25 0.64 2.23
0.28 0.65 2.22
2.05 0.37 -0.60
2.17 0.42 -0.62
2.13 0.41 -0.60
-1.70 -0.22 -0.19
-1.86 -0.24 -0.21
-1.84 -0.23 -0.20
2.27 0.70 1.56
2.29 0.71 1.57
2.29 0.71 1.57
1.74 0.13 0.39
1.70 0.13 0.38
1.69 0.13 0.38
-4.01 -0.84 -1.95
-3.98 -0.84 -1.95
-3.98 -0.84 -1.95
0.26 1.22 3.16
0.23 1.06 2.84
0.27 1.07 2.84
-3.89 -0.52 0.13
-4.06 -0.51 0.17
-3.98 -0.50 0.16
-1.06 -0.46 -0.12
-1.14 -0.49 -0.13
-1.12 -0.48 -0.13
1.02 0.24 1.16
1.00 0.23 1.14
1.00 0.23 1.14
0.53 0.10 0.44
0.52 0.09 0.43
0.52 0.09 0.43
-1.54 -0.33 -1.60
-1.51 -0.33 -1.57
-1.51 -0.33 -1.57
0.77 0.72 2.72
0.77 0.70 2.68
0.77 0.70 2.66
-0.16 -0.16 0.33
-0.13 -0.14 0.32
-0.10 -0.12 0.32
Note: U refers to unconstrained profit-maximizing behavior, C to the Cournot
and F to the leader/follower profit-maximizing behavioral assumption.
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FOOTNOTES
1For example, Appelbaum [1979], Porter [1985], Bresnahan [1981] and Sullivan
[1985] have tended to focus on general industry or product behavior, while
Gollop and Roberts [1979] and Suslow [1986] have focussed more on firm
behavior. For an empirical analysis of the railroad industry incorporating
dynamic behavior, see Green and Porter [1984] and Porter [1983,1985].
2For other studies of the automobile industry, see Timothy Bresnahan
[1987,1981], Ann F. Friedlaender, Ernst R. Berndt and Hua He [1987], and
Melvyn Fuss and Leonard Waverman [1985,1986].
3See Jean Tirole [1988], especially chapters 5 and 6, for a discussion of
dynamic games and their relationship to static behavioral oligopoly models.
4We treat firms as quantity setters for empirical convenience and the ease
that formulating the problem in this fashion provides in interpreting the
estimated coefficients and parameter constraints. Research on price-setting
(Bertrand) behavior is currently in process. It is also worth noting that
since firms usually use price rather than output as a strategic variable, it
is useful to envisage quantity competition as really being a form of capacity
competition, in which firms use capacity rather than output per se as a
strategic variable. In such a case, the profit function can be viewed as a
reduced form, once price competition has been "solved out". For a more
complete discussion of these issues, see Tirole [1988, chapter 5], Kreps and
Scheinkman [1983] and Deneckere and Davidson [1985].
5Specifically, within the automobile industry, model changes occur on a yearly
basis, and product runs are typically reassessed throughout the year.
6For example, firms' objective functions might contain additional arguments
such as net worth, or be characterized by a long-term dynamic view of
profitability rather than a short-term static view.
7Unlike a simple quadratic approximation, a normalized quadratic approximation
satisfies the condition that the cost function is homogeneous of degree one in
factor prices. The normalized quadratic function is discussed in Daniel
McFadden [1978], has been implemented by Ernst R. Berndt, Melvyn Fuss and
Leonard Waverman [1980] and by Catherine J. Morrison and Ernst R. Berndt
[1981]; its curvature and flexibility properties have been assessed by W.
Erwin Diewert and Terence J. Wales [1987].
8The analysis of Bertrand-type price-setting behavior is beyond the scope of
this paper, but will form the basis of a subsequent research project.
91In the case of a pure monopolist (and deleting i-subscripts), the MR/MC
condition analogous to (20) is given by P - ay + a.y + sasyws + Ay,
where A = - 6. Here 6 represents the own-price e;fect in the inverse demand
function. For an empirical implementation of such a monopolistic model using
aggregate industry data, see Morrison [1988,1990]. Note that in the Cournot
case, each oligopolist acts as though it were a monopolist operating in its
given market, where the own price effect 6ii represents the firm inverse
demand function as opposed to the true monopolist inverse demand function 6.
10This approach has been used by, among others, Appelbaum [1982], Bresnahan
[1987], Porter [1983,1985] and Lee and Porter [1984], although Porter has
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explicitly introduced dynamic considerations. For aggregate analyses of
dynamic changes in monopoly power, see Hall [1986], Rotemberg and Saloner
[1986], and Morrison [1988,1990].
11In an interdependent market such as the automobile industry, firms will form
expectations of other firms' endogenous output price, quantity and markup
variables. By using the 3SLS estimation procedure, we ensure that the
conjectured variations in our estimated model are consistent with the rational
expectations hypothesis. For further discussion, see Lars P. Hansen and
Kenneth Singleton [1982].
12Note that when the constraints involve cross-equation restrictions, as they
do for both these tests, it becomes more difficult to assign restrictions to
specific equations. To check on the ability of our overall model to reject
hypotheses, we tested the null hypothesis that parameters of the inverse
output demand, input demand, and MR/MC equations were equal for GM, Ford and
Chrysler; the alternative hypothesis is the unconstrained profit maximization
model summarized in Table 2. We obtained a Wald test statistic of 1637.747,
with the .01 chi-square critical value for 52 restrictions being about 78.6;
hence this null hypothesis is decisively rejected. Incidentally, we also
specified a behavioral model in which total collusion reigned and in which the
three firms were treated as distinct plants producing substitutable outputs,
but owned by a single monopolist. The MR/MC conditions obtained by maximizing
the sum of profits for GM, Ford and Chrysler with respect to these three
outputs turned out to be a slight generalization of (20) in which, for the ith
output, Pi - MCi - X iiYj , where X i " "6ji, i,j - GM, Ford and Chrysler.
We estimated models with and without the A - -6ji restrictions imposed and
tested their empirical validity using the Wald test procedure; the test
statistic for the 9 restrictions was 105.256, while the .01 chi-square
critical value is 19.679; hence the null hypothesis is decisively rejected.
We conclude that our model has sufficient goodness of fit and power to reject
hypotheses, and that our result that the restrictions implied by Cournot and
leader/follower behavior are consistent with the data is a meaningful one.
1 3Not surprisingly, 3SLS parameter estimates from the estimated leader-
follower model do not vary dramatically from those reported in Tables 2 and 4.
14For example, the index of industrial production for motor vehicles and parts
increased 28.4% from a level of 66.8 in 1982 to 85.8 in 1983 (1977 - 100).
Source: Economic Report of the President 1990, Table C-50, p. 350.
150ne result of particular interest here is that for GM and Ford, the
elasticity of cost with respect to product mix becomes closer to zero towards
the end of the sample period, indicating that for these firms, cost become
less sensitive to product mix (the share of large vehicles in total
production). This may reflect the general downsizing of the fleet due to CAFE
standards, and thus the relative homogenization of US automobile production.
16Note that one might interpret the numerical iterative steps toward solving
out this system of nonlinear equations as corresponding to a process in which
market participants adjust quantities until a Nash equilibrium is attained.
17These dollar values have been computed by reversing the normalization
procedure used for estimation, and multiplying the transformed prices and
costs by the price of labor. Thus the values should be interpreted as being
in units of 1975$.
1 8Notice that since returns to scale are not constant, what happens to markups
- PAGE 52 -
INTERDEPENDENT MARKUP BEHAVIOR
for the leading firm is not precisely clear when behavior changes from Cournot
to leader/follower. However, profits for the leader firm should be larger
under leader/follower behavior.
19For a discussion and elaboration of this conventional wisdom on cyclical
markup behavior, see F. M. Scherer [1980].
20For a discussion of the revisionist hypothesis, see Julio Rotemberg and
Garth Saloner [1986]. Mark Bils [1989] has argued that the revisionist
hypothesis might be particularly plausible for durable goods manufacturers,
such as automobiles.
21Estimates of these reduced form general equilibrium elasticities are roughly
similar under the Cournot and leader/follower specifications.
22Before the hedonic adjustment, average output prices for GM, Ford and
Chrysler were $5899.35, $5493.06 and $5390.90, respectively, while average
output quantities were 4.94, 2.67 and 1.30.
23This appendix owes a great deal to Hua He, who developed the examples and
wrote a first draft of it.
24 There is some ambiguity in how one defines the percentage markup. Although
some literature defines it in terms of markup relative to price, we express
the proportional markup relative to marginal cost. This is done for
analytical simplicity, and should not change the qualitative nature of our
findings.
25Further, a shift in w can also be viewed as an exogenous shift in supply.
This has the same effect on equilibrium as that of a shift in v, except that
the effect is multiplied by the positive parameter c.
26For the monopolist to be in equilibrium, 2b + d > 0. This follows because
the marginal cost function must intersect the marginal revenue function from
below, implying that 2b > Idl in the presence of increasing returns to scale.
27The duopoly case is analytically relatively simple and tractable.
Generalization to an n firm oligoply is possible, but the principal results of
interest to us can be obtained within the much simpler duopoly framework, and
therefore we confine our attention here to such a simple market.
28A demand shock could come about from, for example, the introduction of an
improved product or an enhanced marketing program. A supply shock that
increased costs to a single producer could emerge from, for example, a shift
in supplier relationships or differential union behavior. Conversely, firm-
specific supply shocks that reduced costs could be due to, for example, a new
innovation or differential technical progress.
29Just as in the monopolist case, in the oligopoly case stability conditions
require that I2aii/DI > Ib21. This is sufficient to ensure that D1 > 0 even
if the firms in the industry produce under increasing returns to scale.
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